How Should We Protest?
10.12.23.
The protest movements of the past two decades have failed outrageously. Vincent Bevins attributes these failures to the political strategies of their epoch, which attempted to draw a critical mass of popular support through horizontal, leaderless organization. These movements were often too successful in mobilizing support, and the “instigators”–dedicated to horizontalism–were unable to control the large crowds. Western media coverage or conservative political actors who were vertically organized eventually took charge of the protests and articulated new demands, consciously or not.
Our political dispositions are born from the conditions we are trying to fight. The protest movements of the 2010’s were characterized by a sense of optimistic, digital connectivity which naturally influenced the political strategies employed. The internet stood for the liberal order itself: unprecedented democratization alongside all of its financialized contradictions–all were allowed entry, but the suggestion of flattening national and class distinctions brought to light global liberalism’s inadequacies.
The next historical order–our own–has so far been characterized by the fissure of American unipolarity; the reascension of national interests over transnational finance; and the consequent changes to the relationship between liberal subjects and the international order. The horizontalist protests of the last historical period were only possible because those who participated believed that, through claims of grievance to the international order, their appeals to liberal values and sensibilities could actually produce change. (Most recently, the pro-democracy protests in Israel have used this political formulation to try to oust Netanyahu–but to whom are they appealing? And is it realistic that these benevolent powers will hear and act upon the protestors’ petitions?) During this period (as before), Palestinians tried their luck with non-violent strategies within the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel, as well as through international mechanisms. Clearly, these strategies did not work, and so Hamas has turned to a weak form of state terror which has always appeared whenever an historical order’s institutionalized mode of arbitration fails (which, until recently, has looked like a non-violent aspiration towards western democracy).
The question today is not how to convince the masses or our neighbors–“raising awareness” was the site of conflict in our last historical order. Who will hear our calls for help? Who will care? Certainly not the international order, who fundamentally need the Israeli state to remain unchanged. Consider the BDS movement, which is firmly a product of its time (now our preceding era), using liberal democratic strategies to no serious end–the boycott appealed to the moral strength of the market, states, and international institutions: how long could we delude ourselves of this? Boycotts work in localized economies because of a nominal consumer power; we have no such power in international affairs, and certainly not in the global market. Increasingly, states do not have to entertain this democratic illusion–we do not “buy-in” to state authority, it simply exists, and governments are once again willing to acknowledge this reality.
Meanwhile, activism on college campuses and their institutional responses battle for narratives–where will officialdom land? This form of protest recognizes that larger bodies do not need to grant concessions anymore, but still place faith in their ability to pressure smaller institutions to their will. In short, it is a question of stakeholders’ diminishing power. The strategy of divestment (away from fossil fuels, Israel, et cetera) has transferred our focus from public opinion to powerful opinion: “rather than convince the masses, we will convince the universities (through the opinion of amenable student bodies) and occasionally their investors, since these are the remaining corners of our political economy that the media class endows with moral virtue. And from there, state policies will react.”
Besides union organizing, this brand of college activism characterizes the majority of American protest movements, or at least those which exist outside of the raising awareness model. College activism and protests of its kind have taken the culture war away from the general public and into student union committees, board rooms, editorial boards, and other elite professional forums. Disillusioned with the failed popular protests of the last two decades, these movements have decided to more directly attack the channels of power to which they do have access. It is, on its surface, a more sober diagnosis of where power lies. Nevertheless, these movements mistakenly rest upon the belief that the intellectual and professional spaces in question are 1) able to change in the first place and 2) able to influence the wider political economy. The second point is more fundamental here: even if we were able to gather a few signatures from Harvard professors or, hell, redirect the university’s financial investments, this would not make a dent in the billions of dollars the U.S. sends to Israel. Blocking roads to weapons manufacturers seems more in line with this goal, but this timeless strategy will only temporarily stall today’s political economy. How are we supposed to take an ounce of power, really? Statements? It seems unlikely at this point: the international community merely shrugged its shoulders when Azerbaijan removed 100,000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh (and that exodus came more than a month after the former prosecutor of the International Criminal Court used the “G” word to describe the situation). Any reforms or challenges to the Azeri or Israeli states are simply not up for discussion; it seems that their resources, strategic positions, and psychological role within the international ruling class are too important.
So how should we protest today? This seems even more important to me than the goals of our protest. As for the method, I have little to contribute. As for the participants, I would ask why we Americans are only interested in hearing about Palestine/Israel from Palestinians or Jews. Why are these the only two groups to be found within Palestinian advocacy groups in the United States? Because we are still of the mind that we must convince states to adopt policies which live up to their own morals and rhetoric–a Jew is saying the opposite of what they “should,” and so you too should reverse course! In the process, we are treating ourselves–the protestors and the neighbors who we are trying to convince–as we would international institutions or state actors. Even between each other, we use the same inert political logic of markets and states. In truth, we must all be moral and political actors because we all have a stake.
skip to the end, Democratic Realism 01.04.24.